Calling CGI::FormBuilder::field with a name argument in list context
returns zero or more user-specified values of the named field, even
if that field was not declared as supporting multiple values.
Passing the result of field as a function parameter counts as list
context. This is the same bad behaviour that is now discouraged
for CGI::param.
In this case we pass the multiple values to CGI::Session::param.
That accessor has six possible calling conventions, of which four are
documented. If an attacker passes (2*n + 1) values for the 'name'
field, for example name=a&name=b&name=c, we end up in one of the
undocumented calling conventions for param:
# equivalent to: (name => 'a', b => 'c')
$session->param('name', 'a', 'b', 'c')
and the 'b' session parameter is unexpectedly set to an
attacker-specified value.
In particular, if an attacker "bob" specifies
name=bob&name=name&name=alice, then authentication is carried out
for "bob" but the CGI::Session ends up containing {name => 'alice'},
an authentication bypass vulnerability.
This vulnerability is tracked as OVE-
20170111-0001.
(cherry picked from commit
e909eb93f4530a175d622360a8433e833ecf0254)
if ($form->title eq "signin" || $form->title eq "register") {
if (($form->submitted && $form->validate) || $do_register) {
+ my $user_name = $form->field('name');
+
if ($form->submitted eq 'Login') {
- $session->param("name", $form->field("name"));
+ $session->param("name", $user_name);
IkiWiki::cgi_postsignin($cgi, $session);
}
elsif ($form->submitted eq 'Create Account') {
- my $user_name=$form->field('name');
if (IkiWiki::userinfo_setall($user_name, {
'email' => $form->field('email'),
'regdate' => time})) {
}
}
elsif ($form->submitted eq 'Reset Password') {
- my $user_name=$form->field("name");
my $email=IkiWiki::userinfo_get($user_name, "email");
if (! length $email) {
error(gettext("No email address, so cannot email password reset instructions."));