+> So, let me review why symlinks are an issue. For normal, non-underlay
+> pages, users who do not have filesystem access to the server may have
+> commit access, and so could commit eg, a symlink to `/etc/passwd` (or
+> to `/` !). The guards are there to prevent ikiwiki either exposing the
+> symlink target's contents, or potentially overwriting it.
+>
+> Is this a concern for underlays? Most of the time, certianly not;
+> the underlay tends to be something only the site admin controls.
+> Not all the security checks that are done on the srcdir are done
+> on the underlays, either. Most checks done on files in the underlay
+> are only done because the same code handles srcdir files. The one
+> exception is the test that skips processing symlinks in the underlay dir.
+> (But note that the underlay directory can be a symlinkt to elsewhere
+> which the srcdir, by default, cannot.)
+>
+> So, one way to approach this is to make ikiwiki follow directory symlinks
+> inside the underlay directory. Just a matter of passing `follow => 1` to
+> find. (This would still not allow individual files to be symlinks, because
+> `readfile` does not allow reading symlinks. But I don't see much need
+> for that.) --[[Joey]]
+