From: https://id.koumbit.net/anarcat Date: Mon, 30 Mar 2015 23:24:45 +0000 (-0400) Subject: security review seems to say this is an okay change X-Git-Tag: 3.20150610~120 X-Git-Url: http://git.vanrenterghem.biz/git.ikiwiki.info.git/commitdiff_plain/121e9132f3df48780f62beb1c95a348a3626fb24 security review seems to say this is an okay change --- diff --git a/doc/todo/git-annex_support.mdwn b/doc/todo/git-annex_support.mdwn index a0b0a71a5..5e0a3630d 100644 --- a/doc/todo/git-annex_support.mdwn +++ b/doc/todo/git-annex_support.mdwn @@ -178,7 +178,20 @@ index 9d6f636..e0b4cf8 100644 push @IkiWiki::underlayfiles, $f; -Now obviously this patch is incomplete: I am not sure we actually avoid the attack, ie. i am not sure the check in `srcdir()` is sufficient to remove completely the check in `find_src_files()`. It does work, however: the files get picked up from the underlay and properly hardlinked into the target `public_html` directory! So with the above patch, then the following hook in `source.git/hooks/post-receive`: +Now obviously this patch is incomplete: I am not sure we actually avoid the attack, ie. i am not sure the check in `srcdir()` is sufficient to remove completely the check in `find_src_files()`. + +After reviewing the code further, it seems that `find_src_files` in three places in ikiwiki: + +
+../IkiWiki/Render.pm:421:	find_src_files(1, \@files, \%pages);
+../IkiWiki/Render.pm:846:		($files, $pages)=find_src_files();
+../po/po2wiki:18:my ($files, $pages)=IkiWiki::find_src_files();
+
+ +The first occurence is in `IkiWiki::Render::process_changed_files`, where it is used mostly for populating `@IkiWiki::underlayfiles`, the only side effect of +`find_src_files`. The second occurence is in `IkiWiki::Render::refresh`. There things are a little more complicated (to say the least) and a lot of stuff happens. To put it in broad terms, first it does a `IkiWiki::Render::scan` and then a `IkiWiki::Render::render`. The last two call `srcfile()` appropriately (where i put an extra symlink check), except for `will_render()` in `scan`, which I can't figure out right now and that seems to have a lot of global side effects. It still looks fairly safe at first glance. The `rcs_get_current_rev`, `refresh`, `scan` and `rendered` hooks are also called in there, but I assume those to be safe, since they are called with sanitized values already. + +The patch does work: the files get picked up from the underlay and properly hardlinked into the target `public_html` directory! So with the above patch, then the following hook in `source.git/hooks/post-receive`: 
 #!/bin/sh