X-Git-Url: http://git.vanrenterghem.biz/git.ikiwiki.info.git/blobdiff_plain/ce70d375a451eb11f257e310f834972d2e432e82..7eb512205fba0efad301521bbd641848b4890b1d:/doc/security.mdwn diff --git a/doc/security.mdwn b/doc/security.mdwn index 6e1d56a52..0841abf49 100644 --- a/doc/security.mdwn +++ b/doc/security.mdwn @@ -6,7 +6,7 @@ security issues with this program than with cat(1). If, however, you let others edit pages in your wiki, then some possible security issues do need to be kept in mind. -[[toc levels=2]] +[[!toc levels=2]] ---- @@ -41,11 +41,19 @@ who's viewing the wiki, that can be a security problem. Of course nobody else seems to worry about this in other wikis, so should we? -Currently only people with direct commit access can upload such files +People with direct commit access can upload such files (and if you wanted to you could block that with a pre-commit hook). -Users with only web commit access are limited to editing pages as ikiwiki -doesn't support file uploads from browsers (yet), so they can't exploit -this. + +The attachments plugin is not enabled by default. If you choose to +enable it, you should make use of its powerful abilities to filter allowed +types of attachments, and only let trusted users upload. + +It is possible to embed an image in a page edited over the web, by using +`img src="data:image/png;"`. Ikiwiki's htmlscrubber only allows `data:` +urls to be used for `image/*` mime types. It's possible that some broken +browser might ignore the mime type and if the data provided is not an +image, instead run it as javascript, or something evil like that. Hopefully +not many browsers are that broken. ## multiple accessors of wiki directory @@ -58,8 +66,7 @@ So it's best if only one person can ever directly write to those directories. ## setup files Setup files are not safe to keep in the same revision control repository -with the rest of the wiki. Just don't do it. [[ikiwiki.setup]] is *not* -used as the setup file for this wiki, BTW. +with the rest of the wiki. Just don't do it. ## page locking can be bypassed via direct commits @@ -98,7 +105,7 @@ your web server will not run it. ## suid wrappers -ikiwiki --wrapper is intended to generate a wrapper program that +`ikiwiki --wrapper` is intended to generate a wrapper program that runs ikiwiki to update a given wiki. The wrapper can in turn be made suid, for example to be used in a [[post-commit]] hook by people who cannot write to the html pages, etc. @@ -111,9 +118,13 @@ been no problem yet. ## shell exploits ikiwiki does not expose untrusted data to the shell. In fact it doesn't use -system() at all, and the only use of backticks is on data supplied by the -wiki admin and untainted filenames. And it runs with taint checks on of -course.. +`system(3)` at all, and the only use of backticks is on data supplied by the +wiki admin and untainted filenames. + +Ikiwiki was developed and used for a long time with perl's taint checking +turned on as a second layer of defense against shell and other exploits. Due +to a strange [bug](http://bugs.debian.org/411786) in perl, taint checking +is currently disabled for production builds of ikiwiki. ## cgi data security @@ -134,15 +145,15 @@ file not be world readable. ## cgi password security -Login to the wiki involves sending a password in cleartext over the net. -Cracking the password only allows editing the wiki as that user though. -If you care, you can use https, I suppose. If you do use https either for -all of the wiki, or just the cgi access, then consider using the sslcookie -option. +Login to the wiki using [[plugins/passwordauth]] involves sending a password +in cleartext over the net. Cracking the password only allows editing the wiki +as that user though. If you care, you can use https, I suppose. If you do use +https either for all of the wiki, or just the cgi access, then consider using +the sslcookie option. Using [[plugins/openid]] is a potentially better option. ## XSS holes in CGI output -ikiwiki has not yet been audited to ensure that all cgi script input/output +ikiwiki has been audited to ensure that all cgi script input/output is sanitised to prevent XSS attacks. For example, a user can't register with a username containing html code (anymore). @@ -341,7 +352,58 @@ There are at least two configurations where this is exploitable: notice. This security hole was discovered on 26 November 2007 and fixed the same -da with the release of ikiwiki 2.14. I recommend upgrading to this version +day with the release of ikiwiki 2.14. I recommend upgrading to this version if your wiki can be committed to by third parties. Alternatively, don't use a trailing slash in the srcdir, and avoid the (unusual) configurations that allow the security hole to be exploited. + +## javascript insertion via uris + +The htmlscrubber did not block javascript in uris. This was fixed by adding +a whitelist of valid uri types, which does not include javascript. +([[!cve CVE-2008-0809]]) Some urls specifyable by the meta plugin could also +theoretically have been used to inject javascript; this was also blocked +([[!cve CVE-2008-0808]]). + +This hole was discovered on 10 February 2008 and fixed the same day +with the release of ikiwiki 2.31.1. (And a few subsequent versions..) +A fix was also backported to Debian etch, as version 1.33.4. I recommend +upgrading to one of these versions if your wiki can be edited by third +parties. + +## Cross Site Request Forging + +Cross Site Request Forging could be used to constuct a link that would +change a logged-in user's password or other preferences if they clicked on +the link. It could also be used to construct a link that would cause a wiki +page to be modified by a logged-in user. ([[!cve CVE-2008-0165]]) + +These holes were discovered on 10 April 2008 and fixed the same day with +the release of ikiwiki 2.42. A fix was also backported to Debian etch, as +version 1.33.5. I recommend upgrading to one of these versions. + +## Cleartext passwords + +Until version 2.48, ikiwiki stored passwords in cleartext in the `userdb`. +That risks exposing all users' passwords if the file is somehow exposed. To +pre-emtively guard against that, current versions of ikiwiki store password +hashes (using Eksblowfish). + +If you use the [[plugins/passwordauth]] plugin, I recommend upgrading to +ikiwiki 2.48, installing the [[!cpan Authen::Passphrase]] perl module, and running +`ikiwiki-transition hashpassword` to replace all existing cleartext passwords +with strong blowfish hashes. + +You might also consider changing to [[plugins/openid]], which does not +require ikiwiki deal with passwords at all, and does not involve users sending +passwords in cleartext over the net to log in, either. + +## Empty password security hole + +This hole allowed ikiwiki to accept logins using empty passwords, to openid +accounts that didn't use a password. It was introduced in version 1.34, and +fixed in version 2.48. The [bug](http://bugs.debian.org/483770) was +discovered on 30 May 2008 and fixed the same day. ([[!cve CVE-2008-0169]]) + +I recommend upgrading to 2.48 immediatly if your wiki allows both password +and openid logins.