X-Git-Url: http://git.vanrenterghem.biz/git.ikiwiki.info.git/blobdiff_plain/4d6f5e5a144e20bbda1c8e2d7d611b945394448f..2c1908acbd0e64225eed1d4bdd3d0fbd3cf18568:/doc/security.mdwn diff --git a/doc/security.mdwn b/doc/security.mdwn index f3567d155..154566cd8 100644 --- a/doc/security.mdwn +++ b/doc/security.mdwn @@ -6,6 +6,8 @@ security issues with this program than with cat(1). If, however, you let others edit pages in your wiki, then some possible security issues do need to be kept in mind. +[[toc levels=2]] + ---- # Probable holes @@ -16,7 +18,7 @@ _(The list of things to fix.)_ Anyone with direct commit access can forge "web commit from foo" and make it appear on [[RecentChanges]] like foo committed. One way to avoid -this would be to limit web commits to those done by a certian user. +this would be to limit web commits to those done by a certain user. ## other stuff to look at @@ -134,7 +136,9 @@ file not be world readable. Login to the wiki involves sending a password in cleartext over the net. Cracking the password only allows editing the wiki as that user though. -If you care, you can use https, I suppose. +If you care, you can use https, I suppose. If you do use https either for +all of the wiki, or just the cgi access, then consider using the sslcookie +option. ## XSS holes in CGI output @@ -145,6 +149,27 @@ with a username containing html code (anymore). It's difficult to know for sure if all such avenues have really been closed though. +## HTML::Template security + +If the [[plugins/template]] plugin is enabled, users can modify templates +like any other part of the wiki. This assumes that HTML::Template is secure +when used with untrusted/malicious templates. (Note that includes are not +allowed, so that's not a problem.) + +---- + +# Plugins + +The security of [[plugins]] depends on how well they're written and what +external tools they use. The plugins included in ikiwiki are all held to +the same standards as the rest of ikiwiki, but with that said, here are +some security notes for them. + +* The [[plugins/img]] plugin assumes that imagemagick/perlmagick are secure + from malformed image attacks. Imagemagick has had security holes in the + past. To be able to exploit such a hole, a user would need to be able to + upload images to the wiki. + ---- # Fixed holes @@ -247,3 +272,10 @@ seem to affect our use, since the data is not encoded as utf-8 at that point. #[378412](http://bugs.debian.org/378412) could affect us, although it doesn't seem very exploitable. It has a simple fix, and has been fixed in Debian unstable. + +## include loops + +Various directives that cause one page to be included into another could +be exploited to DOS the wiki, by causing a loop. Ikiwiki has always guarded +against this one way or another; the current solution should detect all +types of loops involving preprocessor directives.