* `unixauth_type`: defaults to unset, can be "checkpassword" or "pwauth"
* `unixauth_command`: defaults to unset, should contain the full path and any arguments
-* `unixauth_sslrequire`: defaults to 1, can be 0
-* `sslcookie`: needs to be 1 if `unixauth_sslrequire` is 1 (perhaps this should be done automatically?)
+* `unixauth_requiressl`: defaults to 1, can be 0
+* `sslcookie`: needs to be 1 if `unixauth_requiressl` is 1 (perhaps this should be done automatically?)
__Security__: [As with passwordauth](/security/#index14h2), be wary of sending usernames and passwords in cleartext. Unlike passwordauth, sniffing `unixauth` credentials can get an attacker much further than mere wiki access. Therefore, this plugin defaults to not even _displaying_ the login form fields unless we're running under SSL. Nobody should be able to do anything remotely dumb until the admin has done at least a little thinking. After that, dumb things are always possible. ;-)
use IkiWiki 2.00;
sub import { #{{{
+ hook(type => "getsetup", id => "unixauth", call => \&getsetup);
hook(type => "formbuilder_setup", id => "unixauth",
call => \&formbuilder_setup);
hook(type => "formbuilder", id => "unixauth",
hook(type => "sessioncgi", id => "unixauth", call => \&sessioncgi);
} # }}}
+ sub getsetup () { #{{{
+ return
+ unixauth_type => {
+ type => "string",
+ example => "checkpassword",
+ description => "type of authenticator; can be 'checkpassword' or 'pwauth'",
+ safe => 0,
+ rebuild => 1,
+ },
+ unixauth_command => {
+ type => "string",
+ example => "/path/to/checkpassword",
+ description => "full path and any arguments",
+ safe => 0,
+ rebuild => 1,
+ },
+ unixauth_requiressl => {
+ type => "boolean",
+ example => "1",
+ description => "require SSL? strongly recommended",
+ safe => 0,
+ rebuild => 1,
+ },
+ plugin => {
+ description => "Unix user authentication",
+ safe => 0,
+ rebuild => 1,
+ },
+ } #}}}
+
# Checks if a string matches a user's password, and returns true or false.
sub checkpassword ($$;$) { #{{{
my $user=shift;