web commit from 66.118.98.137:

[git.ikiwiki.info.git] / doc / security.mdwn

diff --git a/doc/security.mdwn b/doc/security.mdwn
index 42795b63eaf8966f0307a7871db6cdfe36b7997f..9c867f42fee03d9058d55e8cf71c4c9da4291ff8 100644 (file)
--- a/doc/security.mdwn
+++ b/doc/security.mdwn
@@ -48,9 +48,14 @@ TODO: seems that locking to prevent more than one ikiwiki run at a time
 would both fix this and is a good idea in general. With locking, an
 attacker couldn't get ikiwiki to svn up while another instance was running.
 
 would both fix this and is a good idea in general. With locking, an
 attacker couldn't get ikiwiki to svn up while another instance was running.
 

-Even with locking, if an attacker has local write access to the checkout,
-they could still fool ikiwiki using similar races. So it's best if only one
-person can ever write to the checkout that ikiwiki compiles the moo from.
+## multiple accessors of wiki source directory
+
+If multiple people can write to the source directory ikiwiki is using, then
+one can cause trouble for the other when they run ikiwiki through symlink
+sttacks.
+
+So it's best if only one person can ever write to the checkout that ikiwiki
+compiles the moo from.

 
 ## webserver symlink attacks
 
 
 ## webserver symlink attacks
 


@@ -58,7 +63,7 @@ If someone checks in a symlink to /etc/passwd, ikiwiki would publish that.
 To aoid this, ikiwiki will need to avoid reading files that are symlinks.
 TODO and note discussion of races above.
 
 To aoid this, ikiwiki will need to avoid reading files that are symlinks.
 TODO and note discussion of races above.
 

-## cgi security
+## cgi data security

 
 When ikiwiki runs as a cgi to edit a page, it is passed the name of the
 page to edit. It has to make sure to sanitise this page, to prevent eg,
 
 When ikiwiki runs as a cgi to edit a page, it is passed the name of the
 page to edit. It has to make sure to sanitise this page, to prevent eg,


@@ -68,6 +73,21 @@ removing unallowed characters, then making sure it doesn't start with "/"
 or contain ".." or "/.svn/". Annoyingly ad-hoc, this kind of code is where
 security holes breed. It needs a test suite at the very least.
 
 or contain ".." or "/.svn/". Annoyingly ad-hoc, this kind of code is where
 security holes breed. It needs a test suite at the very least.
 

+## cgi password security
+
+Login to the wiki involves sending a password in cleartext over the net.
+Cracking the password only allows editing the moo as that user though.
+If you care, you can use https, I suppose.
+
+## CGI::Session security
+
+Is CGI::Session secure? Well, it writes the session files world-readable,
+which could be used by a local attacker to take over someone's session.
+
+I have no idea if CGI::Session writes session files securely to /tmp.
+ikiwiki makes it write them to a directory it controls (but see "multiple
+accessors of wiki source directory" above).
+

 ----
 
 # Probable non-holes
 ----
 
 # Probable non-holes


@@ -95,4 +115,4 @@ security holes. The wrapper is written as securely as I know how, is based on co
 
 ## shell exploits
 
 
 ## shell exploits
 

-ikiwiki does not expose untrusted data to the shell. In fact it doesn't use system() at all, and the only use of backticks is on data supplied by the wiki admin. And it runs with taint checks on of course..
\ No newline at end of file
+ikiwiki does not expose untrusted data to the shell. In fact it doesn't use system() at all, and the only use of backticks is on data supplied by the wiki admin. And it runs with taint checks on of course..