updated from pesco's darcs repo, current to Oct 11 version

[git.ikiwiki.info.git] / doc / security.mdwn

diff --git a/doc/security.mdwn b/doc/security.mdwn
index bbbc98e1f4c39165efc62033e5b79fd282ee1ac9..0841abf495a3d62580bfa849bbc8bafe13d58497 100644 (file)
--- a/doc/security.mdwn
+++ b/doc/security.mdwn
@@ -6,7 +6,7 @@ security issues with this program than with cat(1). If, however, you let
 others edit pages in your wiki, then some possible security issues do need
 to be kept in mind.
 
 others edit pages in your wiki, then some possible security issues do need
 to be kept in mind.
 

-[[toc levels=2]]
+[[!toc levels=2]]

 
 ----
 
 
 ----
 


@@ -41,11 +41,12 @@ who's viewing the wiki, that can be a security problem.
 
 Of course nobody else seems to worry about this in other wikis, so should we?
 
 
 Of course nobody else seems to worry about this in other wikis, so should we?
 

-Currently only people with direct commit access can upload such files
+People with direct commit access can upload such files

 (and if you wanted to you could block that with a pre-commit hook).
 (and if you wanted to you could block that with a pre-commit hook).

-Users with only web commit access are limited to editing pages as ikiwiki
-doesn't support file uploads from browsers (yet), so they can't exploit
-this.
+
+The attachments plugin is not enabled by default. If you choose to
+enable it, you should make use of its powerful abilities to filter allowed
+types of attachments, and only let trusted users upload.

 
 It is possible to embed an image in a page edited over the web, by using
 `img src="data:image/png;"`. Ikiwiki's htmlscrubber only allows `data:`
 
 It is possible to embed an image in a page edited over the web, by using
 `img src="data:image/png;"`. Ikiwiki's htmlscrubber only allows `data:`


@@ -65,8 +66,7 @@ So it's best if only one person can ever directly write to those directories.
 ## setup files
 
 Setup files are not safe to keep in the same revision control repository
 ## setup files
 
 Setup files are not safe to keep in the same revision control repository

-with the rest of the wiki. Just don't do it. [[ikiwiki.setup]] is *not*
-used as the setup file for this wiki, BTW.
+with the rest of the wiki. Just don't do it.

 
 ## page locking can be bypassed via direct commits
 
 
 ## page locking can be bypassed via direct commits
 


@@ -105,7 +105,7 @@ your web server will not run it.
 
 ## suid wrappers
 
 
 ## suid wrappers
 

-ikiwiki --wrapper is intended to generate a wrapper program that
+`ikiwiki --wrapper` is intended to generate a wrapper program that

 runs ikiwiki to update a given wiki. The wrapper can in turn be made suid,
 for example to be used in a [[post-commit]] hook by people who cannot write
 to the html pages, etc.
 runs ikiwiki to update a given wiki. The wrapper can in turn be made suid,
 for example to be used in a [[post-commit]] hook by people who cannot write
 to the html pages, etc.


@@ -118,9 +118,13 @@ been no problem yet.
 ## shell exploits
 
 ikiwiki does not expose untrusted data to the shell. In fact it doesn't use
 ## shell exploits
 
 ikiwiki does not expose untrusted data to the shell. In fact it doesn't use

-system() at all, and the only use of backticks is on data supplied by the
-wiki admin and untainted filenames. And it runs with taint checks on of
-course..
+`system(3)` at all, and the only use of backticks is on data supplied by the
+wiki admin and untainted filenames. 
+
+Ikiwiki was developed and used for a long time with perl's taint checking
+turned on as a second layer of defense against shell and other exploits. Due
+to a strange [bug](http://bugs.debian.org/411786) in perl, taint checking
+is currently disabled for production builds of ikiwiki.

 
 ## cgi data security
 
 
 ## cgi data security
 


@@ -141,11 +145,11 @@ file not be world readable.
 
 ## cgi password security
 
 
 ## cgi password security
 

-Login to the wiki involves sending a password in cleartext over the net.
-Cracking the password only allows editing the wiki as that user though.
-If you care, you can use https, I suppose. If you do use https either for
-all of the wiki, or just the cgi access, then consider using the sslcookie
-option.
+Login to the wiki using [[plugins/passwordauth]] involves sending a password
+in cleartext over the net. Cracking the password only allows editing the wiki
+as that user though. If you care, you can use https, I suppose. If you do use
+https either for all of the wiki, or just the cgi access, then consider using
+the sslcookie option. Using [[plugins/openid]] is a potentially better option.

 
 ## XSS holes in CGI output
 
 
 ## XSS holes in CGI output
 


@@ -357,9 +361,9 @@ allow the security hole to be exploited.
 
 The htmlscrubber did not block javascript in uris. This was fixed by adding
 a whitelist of valid uri types, which does not include javascript. 
 
 The htmlscrubber did not block javascript in uris. This was fixed by adding
 a whitelist of valid uri types, which does not include javascript. 

-([[cve CVE-2008-0809]]) Some urls specifyable by the meta plugin could also
+([[!cve CVE-2008-0809]]) Some urls specifyable by the meta plugin could also

 theoretically have been used to inject javascript; this was also blocked
 theoretically have been used to inject javascript; this was also blocked

-([[cve CVE-2008-0808]]).
+([[!cve CVE-2008-0808]]).

 
 This hole was discovered on 10 February 2008 and fixed the same day
 with the release of ikiwiki 2.31.1. (And a few subsequent versions..)
 
 This hole was discovered on 10 February 2008 and fixed the same day
 with the release of ikiwiki 2.31.1. (And a few subsequent versions..)


@@ -372,8 +376,34 @@ parties.
 Cross Site Request Forging could be used to constuct a link that would
 change a logged-in user's password or other preferences if they clicked on
 the link. It could also be used to construct a link that would cause a wiki
 Cross Site Request Forging could be used to constuct a link that would
 change a logged-in user's password or other preferences if they clicked on
 the link. It could also be used to construct a link that would cause a wiki

-page to be modified by a logged-in user.
+page to be modified by a logged-in user. ([[!cve CVE-2008-0165]])

 
 These holes were discovered on 10 April 2008 and fixed the same day with
 the release of ikiwiki 2.42. A fix was also backported to Debian etch, as
 version 1.33.5. I recommend upgrading to one of these versions.
 
 These holes were discovered on 10 April 2008 and fixed the same day with
 the release of ikiwiki 2.42. A fix was also backported to Debian etch, as
 version 1.33.5. I recommend upgrading to one of these versions.

+
+## Cleartext passwords
+
+Until version 2.48, ikiwiki stored passwords in cleartext in the `userdb`.
+That risks exposing all users' passwords if the file is somehow exposed. To
+pre-emtively guard against that, current versions of ikiwiki store password
+hashes (using Eksblowfish).
+
+If you use the [[plugins/passwordauth]] plugin, I recommend upgrading to
+ikiwiki 2.48, installing the [[!cpan Authen::Passphrase]] perl module, and running
+`ikiwiki-transition hashpassword` to replace all existing cleartext passwords
+with strong blowfish hashes. 
+
+You might also consider changing to [[plugins/openid]], which does not 
+require ikiwiki deal with passwords at all, and does not involve users sending
+passwords in cleartext over the net to log in, either.
+
+## Empty password security hole
+
+This hole allowed ikiwiki to accept logins using empty passwords, to openid
+accounts that didn't use a password. It was introduced in version 1.34, and
+fixed in version 2.48. The [bug](http://bugs.debian.org/483770) was
+discovered on 30 May 2008 and fixed the same day. ([[!cve CVE-2008-0169]])
+
+I recommend upgrading to 2.48 immediatly if your wiki allows both password
+and openid logins.