+- [CVE-2004-0966](http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2004-0966),
+ *i.e.* [Debian bug #278283](http://bugs.debian.org/cgi-bin/bugreport.cgi?bug=278283):
+ the autopoint and gettextize scripts in the GNU gettext package
+ 1.14 and later versions, as used in Trustix Secure Linux 1.5
+ through 2.1 and other operating systems, allows local users to
+ overwrite files via a symlink attack on temporary files.
+- [CVE-2007-4462](http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2007-4462):
+ `lib/Locale/Po4a/Po.pm` in po4a before 0.32 allows local users to
+ overwrite arbitrary files via a symlink attack on the
+ gettextization.failed.po temporary file.
+
+**FIXME**: check whether this plugin would have been a possible attack
+vector to exploit these vulnerabilities.
+
+Depending on my mood, the lack of found security issues can either
+indicate that there are none, or reveal that no-one ever bothered to
+find (and publish) them.
+
+### PO file features
+
+Can any sort of directives be put in po files that will cause mischief
+(ie, include other files, run commands, crash gettext, whatever)?
+
+> No [documented](http://www.gnu.org/software/gettext/manual/gettext.html#PO-Files)
+> directive is supposed to do so. [[--intrigeri]]
+
+### Running po4a on untrusted content
+
+Are there any security issues on running po4a on untrusted content?
+
+To say the least, this issue is not well covered, at least publicly:
+
+- the documentation does not talk about it;
+- grep'ing the source code for `security` or `trust` gives no answer.
+
+On the other hand, a po4a developer answered my questions in
+a convincing manner, stating that processing untrusted content was not
+an initial goal, and analysing in detail the possible issues.
+
+#### Already checked
+
+- the core (`Po.pm`, `Transtractor.pm`) should be safe
+- po4a source code was fully checked for other potential symlink
+ attacks, after discovery of one such issue
+- the only external program run by the core is `diff`, in `Po.pm` (in
+ parts of its code we don't use)
+- `Locale::gettext`: only used to display translated error messages
+- Nicolas François "hopes" `DynaLoader` is safe, and has "no reason to
+ think that `Encode` is not safe"
+- Nicolas François has "no reason to think that `Encode::Guess` is not
+ safe". The po plugin nevertheless avoids using it by defining the
+ input charset (`file_in_charset`) before asking `Transtractor` to
+ read any file. NB: this hack depends on po4a internals to stay
+ the same.
+
+#### To be checked
+
+##### Locale::Po4a modules
+
+The modules we want to use have to be checked, as not all are safe
+(e.g. the LaTeX module's behaviour is changed by commands included in
+the content); they may use regexps generated from the content.
+
+`Chooser.pm` only loads the plugin we tell it too: currently, this
+means the `Text` module only.
+
+`Text` module (I checked the CVS version):
+
+- it does not run any external program
+- only `do_paragraph()` builds regexp's that expand untrusted
+ variables; they seem safe to me, but someone more expert than me
+ will need to check. Joey?
+
+ > Freaky code, but seems ok due to use of `quotementa`.
+
+##### Text::WrapI18N
+
+`Text::WrapI18N` can cause DoS (see the
+[Debian bug #470250](http://bugs.debian.org/470250)), but it is
+optional and we do not need the features it provides.
+
+It is loaded if available by `Locale::Po4a::Common`; looking at the
+code, I'm not sure we can prevent this at all, but maybe some symbol
+table manipulation tricks could work; overriding
+`Locale::Po4a::Common::wrapi18n` may be easier. I'm no expert at all
+in this field. Joey? [[--intrigeri]]
+
+> Update: Nicolas François suggests we add an option to po4a to
+> disable it. It would do the trick, but only for people running
+> a brand new po4a (probably too late for Lenny). Anyway, this option
+> would have to take effect in a `BEGIN` / `eval` that I'm not
+> familiar with. I can learn and do it, in case no Perl wizard
+> volunteers to provide the po4a patch. [[--intrigeri]]
+
+>> That doesn't really need to be in a BEGIN. This patch moves it to
+>> `import`, and makes this disable wrap18n:
+>> `use Locale::Po4a::Common q{nowrapi18n}` --[[Joey]]
+
+<pre>
+--- /usr/share/perl5/Locale/Po4a/Common.pm 2008-07-21 14:54:52.000000000 -0400
++++ Common.pm 2008-11-11 18:27:34.000000000 -0500
+@@ -30,8 +30,16 @@
+ use strict;
+ use warnings;
+
+-BEGIN {
+- if (eval { require Text::WrapI18N }) {
++sub import {
++ my $class=shift;
++ my $wrapi18n=1;
++ if ($_[0] eq 'nowrapi18n') {
++ shift;
++ $wrapi18n=0;
++ }
++ $class->export_to_level(1, $class, @_);
++
++ if ($wrapi18n && eval { require Text::WrapI18N }) {
+
+ # Don't bother determining the wrap column if we cannot wrap.
+ my $col=$ENV{COLUMNS};
+</pre>
+
+##### Term::ReadKey
+
+`Term::ReadKey` is not a hard dependency in our case, *i.e.* po4a
+works nicely without it. But the po4a Debian package recommends
+`libterm-readkey-perl`, so it will probably be installed on most
+systems using the po plugin.
+
+If `$ENV{COLUMNS}` is not set, `Locale::Po4a::Common` uses
+`Term::ReadKey::GetTerminalSize()` to get the terminal size. How safe
+is this?
+
+Part of `Term::ReadKey` is written in C. Depending on the runtime
+platform, this function use ioctl, environment, or C library function
+calls, and may end up running the `resize` command (without
+arguments).
+
+IMHO, using Term::ReadKey has too far reaching implications for us to
+be able to guarantee anything wrt. security. Since it is anyway of no
+use in our case, I suggest we define `ENV{COLUMNS}` before loading
+`Locale::Po4a::Common`, just to be on the safe side. Joey?
+[[--intrigeri]]
+
+> Update: adding an option to disable `Text::WrapI18N`, as Nicolas
+> François suggested, would as a bonus disable `Term::ReadKey`
+> as well. [[--intrigeri]]
+
+### msgmerge
+
+`refreshpofiles()` runs this external program. A po4a developer
+answered he does "not expect any security issues from it".
+
+### Fuzzing input
+
+I was not able to find any public information about gettext or po4a
+having been tested with a fuzzing program, such as `zzuf` or `fusil`.
+Moreover, some gettext parsers seem to be quite
+[easy to crash](http://fusil.hachoir.org/trac/browser/trunk/fuzzers/fusil-gettext),
+so it might be useful to bang msgmerge/po4a's heads against such
+a program in order to easily detect some of the most obvious DoS.
+[[--intrigeri]]
+
+> po4a was not fuzzy-tested, but according to one of its developers,
+> "it would be really appreciated". [[--intrigeri]]
+
+Test conditions:
+
+- a 21M file containing 100 concatenated copies of all the files in my
+ `/usr/share/common-licenses/`; I had no existing PO file or
+ translated versions at hand, which renders these tests
+ quite incomplete.
+- po4a was the Debian 0.34-2 package; the same tests were also run
+ after replacing the `Text` module with the CVS one (the core was not
+ changed in CVS since 0.34-2 was released), without any significant
+ difference in the results.
+- Perl 5.10.0-16
+
+#### po4a-gettextize
+
+`po4a-gettextize` uses more or less the same po4a features as our
+`refreshpot` function.