+
+> Openid's security model does not rely on the openid consumer (ie,
+> ikiwiki) performing any sanity checking of the openid server. All the
+> security authentication goes on between your web browser and the openid
+> server. This may involve ssl, or not.
+>
+> For example, my openid is "http://joey.kitenet.net/". If I log in with
+> this openid, ikiwiki connects to that http url to determine what openid
+> server it uses, and then redirects my browser to the server
+> (https://www.myopenid.com/server), which validates the user and redirects
+> the browser back to ikiwiki with a flag set indicating that the openid
+> was validated. At no point does ikiwiki need to verify that the https url
+> is good.
+> --[[Joey]]
+
+>> Ok, so I guess the worst that could happen when ikiwiki talks to the http
+>> address is that it gets intercepted, and ikiwiki gets the wrong address.
+>> ikiwiki will then redirect the browser to the wrong address. An attacker could
+>> trick ikiwiki to redirect to their site which always validates the user
+>> and then redirects back to ikiwiki. The legitimate user may not even notice.
+>> That doesn't so seem secure to me...
+
+>> All the attacker needs is access to the network somewhere between ikiwiki
+>> and http://joey.kitenet.net/ or the ability to inject false DNS host names
+>> for use by ikiwiki and the rest is simple.
+
+>> -- Brian May