+Config variables that affect the behavior of `unixauth`:
+
+* `unixauth_type`: defaults to unset, can be "checkpassword" or "pwauth"
+* `unixauth_command`: defaults to unset, should contain the full path and any arguments
+* `unixauth_requiressl`: defaults to 1, can be 0
+* `sslcookie`: needs to be 1 if `unixauth_requiressl` is 1 (perhaps this should be done automatically?)
+
+__Security__: [As with passwordauth](/security/#index14h2), be wary of sending usernames and passwords in cleartext. Unlike passwordauth, sniffing `unixauth` credentials can get an attacker much further than mere wiki access. Therefore, this plugin defaults to not even _displaying_ the login form fields unless we're running under SSL. Nobody should be able to do anything remotely dumb until the admin has done at least a little thinking. After that, dumb things are always possible. ;-)
+
+`unixauth` tests for the presence of the `HTTPS` environment variable. `Wrapper.pm` needs to be tweaked to pass it through; without that, the plugin fails closed.
+
+[[!toggle id="diff" text="Wrapper.pm.diff"]]
+
+[[!toggleable id="diff" text="""
+
+ --- Wrapper.pm.orig 2008-07-29 00:09:10.000000000 -0400
+ +++ Wrapper.pm
+ @@ -28,7 +28,7 @@ sub gen_wrapper () {
+ my @envsave;
+ push @envsave, qw{REMOTE_ADDR QUERY_STRING REQUEST_METHOD REQUEST_URI
+ CONTENT_TYPE CONTENT_LENGTH GATEWAY_INTERFACE
+ - HTTP_COOKIE REMOTE_USER} if $config{cgi};
+ + HTTP_COOKIE REMOTE_USER HTTPS} if $config{cgi};
+ my $envsave="";
+ foreach my $var (@envsave) {
+ $envsave.=<<"EOF"
+
+"""]]