others edit pages in your wiki, then some possible security issues do need
to be kept in mind.
-[[toc levels=2]]
+[[!toc levels=2]]
----
Of course nobody else seems to worry about this in other wikis, so should we?
-Currently only people with direct commit access can upload such files
+People with direct commit access can upload such files
(and if you wanted to you could block that with a pre-commit hook).
-Users with only web commit access are limited to editing pages as ikiwiki
-doesn't support file uploads from browsers (yet), so they can't exploit
-this.
+
+The attachments plugin is not enabled by default. If you choose to
+enable it, you should make use of its powerful abilities to filter allowed
+types of attachments, and only let trusted users upload.
It is possible to embed an image in a page edited over the web, by using
`img src="data:image/png;"`. Ikiwiki's htmlscrubber only allows `data:`
## setup files
Setup files are not safe to keep in the same revision control repository
-with the rest of the wiki. Just don't do it. [[ikiwiki.setup]] is *not*
-used as the setup file for this wiki, BTW.
+with the rest of the wiki. Just don't do it.
## page locking can be bypassed via direct commits
## suid wrappers
-ikiwiki --wrapper is intended to generate a wrapper program that
+`ikiwiki --wrapper` is intended to generate a wrapper program that
runs ikiwiki to update a given wiki. The wrapper can in turn be made suid,
for example to be used in a [[post-commit]] hook by people who cannot write
to the html pages, etc.
## shell exploits
ikiwiki does not expose untrusted data to the shell. In fact it doesn't use
-system() at all, and the only use of backticks is on data supplied by the
-wiki admin and untainted filenames. And it runs with taint checks on of
-course..
+`system(3)` at all, and the only use of backticks is on data supplied by the
+wiki admin and untainted filenames.
+
+Ikiwiki was developed and used for a long time with perl's taint checking
+turned on as a second layer of defense against shell and other exploits. Due
+to a strange [bug](http://bugs.debian.org/411786) in perl, taint checking
+is currently disabled for production builds of ikiwiki.
## cgi data security
## cgi password security
-Login to the wiki involves sending a password in cleartext over the net.
-Cracking the password only allows editing the wiki as that user though.
-If you care, you can use https, I suppose. If you do use https either for
-all of the wiki, or just the cgi access, then consider using the sslcookie
-option.
+Login to the wiki using [[plugins/passwordauth]] involves sending a password
+in cleartext over the net. Cracking the password only allows editing the wiki
+as that user though. If you care, you can use https, I suppose. If you do use
+https either for all of the wiki, or just the cgi access, then consider using
+the sslcookie option. Using [[plugins/openid]] is a potentially better option.
## XSS holes in CGI output
-ikiwiki has not yet been audited to ensure that all cgi script input/output
+ikiwiki has been audited to ensure that all cgi script input/output
is sanitised to prevent XSS attacks. For example, a user can't register
with a username containing html code (anymore).
## javascript insertion via uris
The htmlscrubber did not block javascript in uris. This was fixed by adding
-a whitelist of valid uri types, which does not include javascript. Some
-urls specifyable by the meta plugin could also theoretically have been used
-to inject javascript; this was also blocked.
+a whitelist of valid uri types, which does not include javascript.
+([[!cve CVE-2008-0809]]) Some urls specifyable by the meta plugin could also
+theoretically have been used to inject javascript; this was also blocked
+([[!cve CVE-2008-0808]]).
This hole was discovered on 10 February 2008 and fixed the same day
with the release of ikiwiki 2.31.1. (And a few subsequent versions..)
A fix was also backported to Debian etch, as version 1.33.4. I recommend
upgrading to one of these versions if your wiki can be edited by third
parties.
+
+## Cross Site Request Forging
+
+Cross Site Request Forging could be used to constuct a link that would
+change a logged-in user's password or other preferences if they clicked on
+the link. It could also be used to construct a link that would cause a wiki
+page to be modified by a logged-in user. ([[!cve CVE-2008-0165]])
+
+These holes were discovered on 10 April 2008 and fixed the same day with
+the release of ikiwiki 2.42. A fix was also backported to Debian etch, as
+version 1.33.5. I recommend upgrading to one of these versions.
+
+## Cleartext passwords
+
+Until version 2.48, ikiwiki stored passwords in cleartext in the `userdb`.
+That risks exposing all users' passwords if the file is somehow exposed. To
+pre-emtively guard against that, current versions of ikiwiki store password
+hashes (using Eksblowfish).
+
+If you use the [[plugins/passwordauth]] plugin, I recommend upgrading to
+ikiwiki 2.48, installing the [[!cpan Authen::Passphrase]] perl module, and running
+`ikiwiki-transition hashpassword` to replace all existing cleartext passwords
+with strong blowfish hashes.
+
+You might also consider changing to [[plugins/openid]], which does not
+require ikiwiki deal with passwords at all, and does not involve users sending
+passwords in cleartext over the net to log in, either.
+
+## Empty password security hole
+
+This hole allowed ikiwiki to accept logins using empty passwords, to openid
+accounts that didn't use a password. It was introduced in version 1.34, and
+fixed in version 2.48. The [bug](http://bugs.debian.org/483770) was
+discovered on 30 May 2008 and fixed the same day. ([[!cve CVE-2008-0169]])
+
+I recommend upgrading to 2.48 immediatly if your wiki allows both password
+and openid logins.