IIUC, the current version of [HTML::Scrubber][] allows for the `object` tags to be either enabled or disabled entirely.  However, while `object` can be used to add *code* (which is indeed a potential security hole) to a document, reading [Objects, Images, and Applets in HTML documents][objects-html] reveals that the “dangerous” are not all the `object`s, but rather those having the following attributes:

    classid     %URI;          #IMPLIED  -- identifies an implementation --
    codebase    %URI;          #IMPLIED  -- base URI for classid, data, archive--
    codetype    %ContentType;  #IMPLIED  -- content type for code --
    archive     CDATA          #IMPLIED  -- space-separated list of URIs --

It seems that the following attributes are, OTOH, safe:

    declare     (declare)      #IMPLIED  -- declare but don't instantiate flag --
    data        %URI;          #IMPLIED  -- reference to object's data --
    type        %ContentType;  #IMPLIED  -- content type for data --
    standby     %Text;         #IMPLIED  -- message to show while loading --
    height      %Length;       #IMPLIED  -- override height --
    width       %Length;       #IMPLIED  -- override width --
    usemap      %URI;          #IMPLIED  -- use client-side image map --
    name        CDATA          #IMPLIED  -- submit as part of form --
    tabindex    NUMBER         #IMPLIED  -- position in tabbing order --

Should the former attributes be *scrubbed* while the latter left intact, the use of the `object` tag would seemingly become safe.

Note also that allowing `object` (either restricted in such a way or not) automatically solves the [[/todo/svg]] issue.

For Ikiwiki, it may be nice to be able to restrict [URI's][URI] (as required by the `data` and `usemap` attributes) to, say, relative and `data:` (as per [RFC 2397][]) ones as well, though it requires some more consideration.

— [[Ivan_Shmakov]], 2010-03-12Z.

[[wishlist]]

> SVG can contain embedded javascript.

>> Indeed.

>> So, a more general tool (`XML::Scrubber`?) will be necessary to
>> refine both [XHTML][] and SVG.

>> … And to leave [MathML][] as is (?.)

>> — [[Ivan_Shmakov]], 2010-03-12Z.

> The spec that you link to contains
> examples of objects that contain python scripts, Microsoft OLE 
> objects, and Java. And then there's flash. I don't think ikiwiki can
> assume all the possibilities are handled securely, particularly WRT XSS
> attacks.
> --[[Joey]]

>> I've scanned over all the `object` examples in the specification and
>> all of those that hold references to code (as opposed to data) have a
>> distinguishing `classid` attribute.

>> While I won't assert that it's impossible to reference code with
>> `data` (and, thanks to `text/xhtml+xml` and `image/svg+xml`, it is
>> *not* impossible), throwing away any of the “insecure”
>> attributes listed above together with limiting the possible URI's
>> (i. e., only *local* and certain `data:` ones for `data` and
>> `usemap`) should make `object` almost as harmless as, say, `img`.

>>> But with local data, one could not embed youtube videos, which surely
>>> is the most obvious use case?

>>>> Allowing a “remote” object to render on one's page is a
     security issue by itself.
     Though, of course, having an explicit whitelist of URI's may make
     this issue more tolerable.
     — [[Ivan_Shmakov]], 2010-03-12Z.

>>> Note that youtube embedding uses an
>>> object element with no classid. The swf file is provided via an
>>> enclosed param element. --[[Joey]]

>>>> I've just checked a random video on YouTube and I see that the
     `.swf` file is provided via an enclosed `embed` element.  Whether
     to allow those or not is a different issue.
     — [[Ivan_Shmakov]], 2010-03-12Z.

>> (Though it certainly won't solve the [[SVG_problem|/todo/SVG]] being
>> restricted in such a way.)

>> Of the remaining issues I could only think of recursive
>> `object` — the one that references its container document.

>> — [[Ivan_Shmakov]], 2010-03-12Z.

## See also

* [Objects, Images, and Applets in HTML documents][objects-html]
* [[plugins/htmlscrubber|/plugins/htmlscrubber]]
* [[todo/svg|/todo/svg]]
* [RFC 2397: The “data” URL scheme. L. Masinter. August 1998.][RFC 2397]
* [Uniform Resource Identifier — the free encyclopedia][URI]

[HTML::Scrubber]: http://search.cpan.org/~podmaster/HTML-Scrubber-0.08/Scrubber.pm
[MathML]: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/MathML
[objects-html]: http://www.w3.org/TR/1999/REC-html401-19991224/struct/objects.html
[RFC 2397]: http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc2397
[URI]: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Uniform_Resource_Identifier
[XHTML]: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/XHTML